In re Valentino G.
Matter of Valentino G.
2007 NY Slip Op 00079
Decided on January 9, 2007
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to
Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the Official Reports.
Decided on January 9, 2007
Sullivan, J.P., Williams, Sweeny, Catterson,
Malone, JJ.
10041
[*1]In re Valentino G., A Dependent Child Under
the Age of Eighteen Years, etc., Valentino G., Respondent-Appellant, Children's
Aid Society, Petitioner-Respondent.
George E. Reed, Jr.,
Rosin
counsel), for respondent.
Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society,
Newbery of counsel), Law Guardian.
Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Gloria
Sosa-Lintner, J.), entered September 13, 2005, which
terminated respondent father's parental rights to the subject child upon a
finding that he failed to comply with the terms of a suspended judgment imposed
on December 8, 2004, and committed custody and guardianship of the child to
petitioner agency and the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New
York for the purpose of adoption, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The evidence that respondent could not care for the child,
that he had a pattern of relapsing during drug treatment, that the child would
have to leave his foster home eventually, and that termination of respondent's
parental rights would permit petitioner to photo list the child, thereby enhancing
its ability to locate a pre-adoptive home for him, supports the court's finding
that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's best
interests (see e.g. Matter of Aparicio Rodrigo B., 29
AD3d 351 [2006]; Matter of Rigoberto M., 18 AD3d 405
[2005]). That the child's chances of being adopted may not be high does not
preclude a finding that termination is in his best interests (see Matter of
Wesley Antonio C., 287 AD2d 374 [2001]). Moreover, a suspended judgment is
"a brief grace period designed to prepare the parent to be reunited with
the child" (Matter of Michael B., 80 NY2d 299, 311 [1992]), not the
indefinite grace period respondent apparently seeks.
In view of the agreement among petitioner agency, the foster
mother and the law guardian [*2]to permit respondent
to visit with the child, we see no need to grant respondent's alternative
request for an order of post-termination visitation (see Matter of April S.,
307 AD2d 204 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 504 [2003]).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
ENTERED: JANUARY 9, 2007
CLERK